HTTP and HTTPS sessions question

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balzer

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Some secure sites have HTTPS session stay secure from login till end of

communication with site(log off).

Some sites are HTTPS only when log in, after login, they become HTTP, and

become HTTPS only when log off. (Yahoo mail for example, etc)

What are the chances that session can be intercepted and sidejacked and

traffic content recorded, especially as I know this danger really exists,

and its carried purposefully and intentionally, by recording DSL traffic.
 
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&...tack&aq=3&aqi=g10&aql=&oq=session+hi&gs_rfai=

balzer wrote:

> Some secure sites have HTTPS session stay secure from login till end of

> communication with site(log off).

> Some sites are HTTPS only when log in, after login, they become HTTP,

> and become HTTPS only when log off. (Yahoo mail for example, etc)

> What are the chances that session can be intercepted and sidejacked and

> traffic content recorded, especially as I know this danger really

> exists, and its carried purposefully and intentionally, by recording DSL

> traffic.

>
 
balzer wrote:



> Some secure sites have HTTPS session stay secure from login till end of

> communication with site(log off).

> Some sites are HTTPS only when log in, after login, they become HTTP, and

> become HTTPS only when log off. (Yahoo mail for example, etc)

> What are the chances that session can be intercepted and sidejacked and

> traffic content recorded, especially as I know this danger really exists,

> and its carried purposefully and intentionally, by recording DSL traffic.




https://mail.yahoo.com



HTTPS is used to load the web page that present the input controls for you

to enter your login credentials. Once you send your login credentials (to

an SSL-secured server), you are switched to HTTP. It is ONLY the login

credentials that are getting protected. This is how it works for SSL

connects in e-mail clients, too. SSL is only used during user validation

(when USER and PASS commands are used to send the login credentials). The

rest of the e-mail session is sent as plain text, so anyone could sniff out

the contents of your e-mail traffic.



If you want to prevent anyone from sniffing your outbound e-mails, you will

need to encrypt them. That means you need the public key from the e-mail

certificate for the person to whom you are sending an encrypted e-mail.

That is, you need their public key to send them an encrypted e-mail (which

they then decrypt using their private key that only they have). They have

to send you a digitally signed e-mail to include their public key for you to

get it and then save in a contact record (which then you must use when you

later want to encrypt e-mail that you send to them using their public key).



http://www.hotmail.com



HTTP is used to paint the login page. It is unimportant that the web page

that present the inputs for login be secured. That page is rendered locally

in your web browser on your host and hasn't yet been sent anywhere with your

login data. When you send your login, Hotmail then connects to an

SSL-secured host. That means an SSL connection must be made BEFORE the

login credentials can be sent. It is only important that SSL/TSL be used

*when* you SEND your login credentials, not when you are typing them into

your web browser (which is something shown on your host and hasn't yet

transmitted anything). So users get concerned that the login page itself

isn't SSL-secured but it is irrelevant since that page was sent to YOU and

doesn't anything of your login credentials. It is to WHERE the data you

enter in the form for that web page gets sent that is important. If that

web page's form data gets sent to an SSL-secured server, the SSL connect

must be established before that data can be transmitted.



HTTP is used to present the login web page. HTTPS is used to actually

*send* your login credentials. Then you're back to HTTP when you connect to

their webmail client which means traffic is not encrypted and any packet

sniffer on your network can look at it. Like above, if you want to protect

your outbound e-mail traffic then you need to encrypt it using the public

key you got from the recipient to whom you send that encrypted e-mail.



If you want to receive protected e-mail traffic then you need to get the

sender to encrypt their e-mails using your public key. The data remains

encrypted until received into your e-mail client where it gets decrypted by

your private key that only you have. If you only use webmail clients to

access your e-mail account(s) then typically nothing of their traffic (other

than the login credentials) will be secure. Webmail clients cannot use your

e-mail cert to send encrypted emails (that only the recipient can decrypt)

or to receive encrypted traffic (that only you can decrypt). SSL/TSL takes

additional resources to handle and these mail servers have thousands if not

millions of users to handle concurrently. Free services are obviously

interested in handling the most customers with the least overhead.



http://www.gmail.com



HTTPS is used for the login page. And HTTPS is used for their webmail

client. This is the only webmail-based client (that I know of) for a *free*

e-mail provider that not only secures the login credentials but also the

traffic between you and their site (which means you reading your e-mails is

also secured from packet sniffers). Usually you have to get a paid e-mail

account to get HTTPS during the webmail session (but most paid e-mail

providers still don't provide SSL during the webmail session so you have to

check with them whether they do or not).



Typically SSL is used only for a webmail or local e-mail client during the

authentication to protect the login credentials. Thereafter the traffic is

plain text. Gmail is the exception regarding their webmail client. I have

not checked if, as typical, if Gmail drops the SSL connection after the

login authentication as is typical with other e-mail providers.



In general:

- For local e-mail clients, SSL is used only to secure the login

credentials, not the rest of the e-mail traffic.

* If you don't want your outbound e-mails sniffed out, encrypt them (using

the public key for the recipient to whom you send that encrypted

e-mail).

* If you don't want your inbound e-mails sniffed out, make sure senders

send you encrypted e-mails (using your public key).

- For webmail clients, SSL (HTTPS) is used only to secure the login

credentials which drops to HTTP when you view the webmail client's web

pages. Gmail is the exception that I know of (HTTPS is used for both

transmission of login credentials and display of webmail client pages).



Most users believe that enabling an SSL connection to their e-mail servers

protects all of their e-mail traffic. Wrong in the majority of cases. SSL

is only used to secure the login credentials, not the e-mail traffic.

That's why encrypted e-mails became important for those that actually want

to secure the *content* of their e-mails and not just their logins.



For local e-mails client connecting to mail servers, and even if the mail

server continued the SSL connection after the login authentication to also

secure all of the e-mail traffic, this traffic is only protected between

you and your mail server (and through whatever hosts are between you two).

Traffic sent between mail servers may pass through several hosts and it

won't be encrypted. You securing a third of the route (between you and your

sending mail server) still leaves insecure the route between mail servers

and also between the recipient and their receiving mail server (if they

don't use SSL connects which survive longer than just the login

authentication). Because the rest of the route between you and recipient is

not secure, there really isn't much point in securing the email traffic

between you and your mail server other than the login credentials.



This is like you running around nude inside your house with blacked out

windows but then dashing outside while still nude to get to your neighbor's

house that has glass walls. Your protected inside your house but exposed

while outside and even at the destination. You put on clothes while inside,

outside, or elsewhere to protect your privacy. You putting a postcard in

your locked mailbox to which only you and your mailman have a key is not

going to prevent anyone from reading that postcard after the mailman removes

it from your mailbox. After it's outside your mailbox, it is exposed during

the entire time it is getting delivered. You put an envelope around your

mails that you want to keep private.



If you want your outbound e-mails to be secure then encrypt them. If you

want your inbound e-mails to be secure then tell your senders to encrypt

them. Using SSL in a local e-mail client typically only secures your login

credentials, not your e-mail traffic. Webmail clients use SSL to only

secure the login credentials, not their web page traffic (with Gmail being

an exception). That only protects one portion of the entire route between

you and the other party involved in sending or receiving e-mails.



The Case for Email Security

http://luxsci.com/blog/the-case-for-email-security.html



There are lots of articles to find regarding SSL, login security, e-mail

traffic security, and encrypting e-mails just by Googling around.



Encryption hasn't caught on because it is a pain to setup and use. It is

not a pervasive or enforced setup. For example, to send an encrypted

e-mail:



- The other party has to first send you a digitally signed e-mail.

- When you receive their e-mail, it has their public key.

- You have to save them as a contact in your address book.

- That will save their public key in the contact record.

- Manually entering an e-mail address won't include their public key.

- Using cached manual entries won't include their public key.

- To encrypt an e-mail to them, you must use the contact record where their

public key got recorded.

- The encrypted e-mail is secure no matter if you do or don't use SSL to

secure your login credentials and/or e-mail traffic with the server. It

is protected even after your mail server in the rest of the route that

isn't secured.

- The recipient uses their private key to decrypt your e-mail.



You have to get their public key. You have to use their public key to

encrypt your e-mail that you send to them. They have to use their private

key to decrypt your e-mail. Usually the biggest efforts are expended in

getting an e-mail certificate and then importing it to your host so your

e-mail client can use it to digitally sign your outbound e-mails (to give

others your public key) or to decrypt incoming e-mails (that used your

public key). Thereafter, you either have to remember to manually add your

cert's public key to your outbound e-mails or configure your e-mail client

to always digitally sign your e-mails. Be warned that anything the modifies

your e-mail after you send it will violate your digital signature to the

recipient. An example of such corruption are anti-virus programs that

append a stupid and useless notice at the end of e-mails that purport the

sender scanned the e-mail before sending it (which is just text so it is

useless as any spammer/scammer could add that text, too). Another example

is using a freebie e-mail provider that appends their spam promotional

signature at the end of your e-mails. If you get a digitally signed e-mail,

you'll have to remember to save that sender in your contacts list so you can

later use their public key to encrypt your e-mails that you send to them for

which only they have their private key to decrypt it. Once setup, the

effort is minimal but it is the initial setup that scares off most users

from sending digitally signed or encrypted e-mails. Most users don't have

the gumption to even look at the user-configurable options for their e-mail

clients and come here begging for help on what they could already find.
 
"VanguardLH" wrote in message

news:hq8d37$77o$1@news.albasani.net...

> balzer wrote:

>

>> Some secure sites have HTTPS session stay secure from login till end of

>> communication with site(log off).

>> Some sites are HTTPS only when log in, after login, they become HTTP, and

>> become HTTPS only when log off. (Yahoo mail for example, etc)

>> What are the chances that session can be intercepted and sidejacked and

>> traffic content recorded, especially as I know this danger really exists,

>> and its carried purposefully and intentionally, by recording DSL traffic.


>

> https://mail.yahoo.com

>

> HTTPS is used to load the web page that present the input controls for you

> to enter your login credentials. Once you send your login credentials (to

> an SSL-secured server), you are switched to HTTP. It is ONLY the login

> credentials that are getting protected. This is how it works for SSL

> connects in e-mail clients, too. SSL is only used during user validation

> (when USER and PASS commands are used to send the login credentials). The

> rest of the e-mail session is sent as plain text, so anyone could sniff

> out

> the contents of your e-mail traffic.

>

> If you want to prevent anyone from sniffing your outbound e-mails, you

> will

> need to encrypt them. That means you need the public key from the e-mail

> certificate for the person to whom you are sending an encrypted e-mail.

> That is, you need their public key to send them an encrypted e-mail (which

> they then decrypt using their private key that only they have). They have

> to send you a digitally signed e-mail to include their public key for you

> to

> get it and then save in a contact record (which then you must use when you

> later want to encrypt e-mail that you send to them using their public

> key).

>

> http://www.hotmail.com

>

> HTTP is used to paint the login page. It is unimportant that the web page

> that present the inputs for login be secured. That page is rendered

> locally

> in your web browser on your host and hasn't yet been sent anywhere with

> your

> login data. When you send your login, Hotmail then connects to an

> SSL-secured host. That means an SSL connection must be made BEFORE the

> login credentials can be sent. It is only important that SSL/TSL be used

> *when* you SEND your login credentials, not when you are typing them into

> your web browser (which is something shown on your host and hasn't yet

> transmitted anything). So users get concerned that the login page itself

> isn't SSL-secured but it is irrelevant since that page was sent to YOU and

> doesn't anything of your login credentials. It is to WHERE the data you

> enter in the form for that web page gets sent that is important. If that

> web page's form data gets sent to an SSL-secured server, the SSL connect

> must be established before that data can be transmitted.

>

> HTTP is used to present the login web page. HTTPS is used to actually

> *send* your login credentials. Then you're back to HTTP when you connect

> to

> their webmail client which means traffic is not encrypted and any packet

> sniffer on your network can look at it. Like above, if you want to

> protect

> your outbound e-mail traffic then you need to encrypt it using the public

> key you got from the recipient to whom you send that encrypted e-mail.

>

> If you want to receive protected e-mail traffic then you need to get the

> sender to encrypt their e-mails using your public key. The data remains

> encrypted until received into your e-mail client where it gets decrypted

> by

> your private key that only you have. If you only use webmail clients to

> access your e-mail account(s) then typically nothing of their traffic

> (other

> than the login credentials) will be secure. Webmail clients cannot use

> your

> e-mail cert to send encrypted emails (that only the recipient can decrypt)

> or to receive encrypted traffic (that only you can decrypt). SSL/TSL

> takes

> additional resources to handle and these mail servers have thousands if

> not

> millions of users to handle concurrently. Free services are obviously

> interested in handling the most customers with the least overhead.

>

> http://www.gmail.com

>

> HTTPS is used for the login page. And HTTPS is used for their webmail

> client. This is the only webmail-based client (that I know of) for a

> *free*

> e-mail provider that not only secures the login credentials but also the

> traffic between you and their site (which means you reading your e-mails

> is

> also secured from packet sniffers). Usually you have to get a paid e-mail

> account to get HTTPS during the webmail session (but most paid e-mail

> providers still don't provide SSL during the webmail session so you have

> to

> check with them whether they do or not).

>

> Typically SSL is used only for a webmail or local e-mail client during the

> authentication to protect the login credentials. Thereafter the traffic

> is

> plain text. Gmail is the exception regarding their webmail client. I

> have

> not checked if, as typical, if Gmail drops the SSL connection after the

> login authentication as is typical with other e-mail providers.

>

> In general:

> - For local e-mail clients, SSL is used only to secure the login

> credentials, not the rest of the e-mail traffic.

> * If you don't want your outbound e-mails sniffed out, encrypt them

> (using

> the public key for the recipient to whom you send that encrypted

> e-mail).

> * If you don't want your inbound e-mails sniffed out, make sure senders

> send you encrypted e-mails (using your public key).

> - For webmail clients, SSL (HTTPS) is used only to secure the login

> credentials which drops to HTTP when you view the webmail client's web

> pages. Gmail is the exception that I know of (HTTPS is used for both

> transmission of login credentials and display of webmail client pages).

>

> Most users believe that enabling an SSL connection to their e-mail servers

> protects all of their e-mail traffic. Wrong in the majority of cases.

> SSL

> is only used to secure the login credentials, not the e-mail traffic.

> That's why encrypted e-mails became important for those that actually want

> to secure the *content* of their e-mails and not just their logins.

>

> For local e-mails client connecting to mail servers, and even if the mail

> server continued the SSL connection after the login authentication to also

> secure all of the e-mail traffic, this traffic is only protected between

> you and your mail server (and through whatever hosts are between you two).

> Traffic sent between mail servers may pass through several hosts and it

> won't be encrypted. You securing a third of the route (between you and

> your

> sending mail server) still leaves insecure the route between mail servers

> and also between the recipient and their receiving mail server (if they

> don't use SSL connects which survive longer than just the login

> authentication). Because the rest of the route between you and recipient

> is

> not secure, there really isn't much point in securing the email traffic

> between you and your mail server other than the login credentials.

>

> This is like you running around nude inside your house with blacked out

> windows but then dashing outside while still nude to get to your

> neighbor's

> house that has glass walls. Your protected inside your house but exposed

> while outside and even at the destination. You put on clothes while

> inside,

> outside, or elsewhere to protect your privacy. You putting a postcard in

> your locked mailbox to which only you and your mailman have a key is not

> going to prevent anyone from reading that postcard after the mailman

> removes

> it from your mailbox. After it's outside your mailbox, it is exposed

> during

> the entire time it is getting delivered. You put an envelope around your

> mails that you want to keep private.

>

> If you want your outbound e-mails to be secure then encrypt them. If you

> want your inbound e-mails to be secure then tell your senders to encrypt

> them. Using SSL in a local e-mail client typically only secures your

> login

> credentials, not your e-mail traffic. Webmail clients use SSL to only

> secure the login credentials, not their web page traffic (with Gmail being

> an exception). That only protects one portion of the entire route between

> you and the other party involved in sending or receiving e-mails.

>

> The Case for Email Security

> http://luxsci.com/blog/the-case-for-email-security.html

>

> There are lots of articles to find regarding SSL, login security, e-mail

> traffic security, and encrypting e-mails just by Googling around.

>

> Encryption hasn't caught on because it is a pain to setup and use. It is

> not a pervasive or enforced setup. For example, to send an encrypted

> e-mail:

>

> - The other party has to first send you a digitally signed e-mail.

> - When you receive their e-mail, it has their public key.

> - You have to save them as a contact in your address book.

> - That will save their public key in the contact record.

> - Manually entering an e-mail address won't include their public key.

> - Using cached manual entries won't include their public key.

> - To encrypt an e-mail to them, you must use the contact record where

> their

> public key got recorded.

> - The encrypted e-mail is secure no matter if you do or don't use SSL to

> secure your login credentials and/or e-mail traffic with the server. It

> is protected even after your mail server in the rest of the route that

> isn't secured.

> - The recipient uses their private key to decrypt your e-mail.

>

> You have to get their public key. You have to use their public key to

> encrypt your e-mail that you send to them. They have to use their private

> key to decrypt your e-mail. Usually the biggest efforts are expended in

> getting an e-mail certificate and then importing it to your host so your

> e-mail client can use it to digitally sign your outbound e-mails (to give

> others your public key) or to decrypt incoming e-mails (that used your

> public key). Thereafter, you either have to remember to manually add your

> cert's public key to your outbound e-mails or configure your e-mail client

> to always digitally sign your e-mails. Be warned that anything the

> modifies

> your e-mail after you send it will violate your digital signature to the

> recipient. An example of such corruption are anti-virus programs that

> append a stupid and useless notice at the end of e-mails that purport the

> sender scanned the e-mail before sending it (which is just text so it is

> useless as any spammer/scammer could add that text, too). Another example

> is using a freebie e-mail provider that appends their spam promotional

> signature at the end of your e-mails. If you get a digitally signed

> e-mail,

> you'll have to remember to save that sender in your contacts list so you

> can

> later use their public key to encrypt your e-mails that you send to them

> for

> which only they have their private key to decrypt it. Once setup, the

> effort is minimal but it is the initial setup that scares off most users

> from sending digitally signed or encrypted e-mails. Most users don't have

> the gumption to even look at the user-configurable options for their

> e-mail

> clients and come here begging for help on what they could already find.


----------------



One way can be restrict access to email service based on IP address. But

don't know email services which support this.
 
balzer wrote:



> One way can be restrict access to email service based on IP address. But

> don't know email services which support this.




How would that work for dial-up users where their IP address changes every

time they negotiate a new connection with the DHCP server? IP addresses for

broadband users (DSL and cable) *do* expire. After, day, 3 days their

current IP address expires and they become "eligible" for a renegotiated IP

address from the DHCP server for whenever they unbind from the old IP

address, like when the user reboots their host (although some ISPs seem to

block further network traffic after some time for an expired IP address even

if the user doesn't unbind from the expired one). Very few user actually

have a static IP address assigned to them by their ISP.



There would be no way to guarantee that someone connecting with an IP

address some number of hours later was the same person that previously

connected using the same IP address. Users also travel with their laptops

or use computers at Internet cafes, libraries, resorts, and so on and

obviously those same users accessing their accounts would be using different

IP addresses.



Restricting access based on the IP address would work only for a few users

that have a static IP address and register it with the e-mail provider so

only that IP address can access a particular account. I suppose that is

possible but I haven't come across any e-mail providers providing this

restriction.



Also, restricting someone to a particular IP address to use a specific

e-mail account does NOTHING regarding the securing of the e-mail traffic

between the mail server and the host at that IP address. It also does not

address the securing of the content of e-mails past the mail server (i.e.,

for the *rest* of the route between sender and recipient).
 
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